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Comments
The Patenting of MIS Computer
Programs: One Step Beyond
INTRODUCTION
To obtain a patent on an invention, an applicant must meet both
substantive and procedural requirements.' The first substantive re-
quirement demands that the subject matter of the invention be
suitable for patent protection: the "subject matter requirement."
' 2
1. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMETTIVE PRocEss 747 (3d
ed. 1986) (setting out nine major requirements for a valid patent; four procedural requirements
and five substantive requirements). The patent statute, 35 United States Code sections 1-293,
codifies these requirements which are referred to below by section number only. Id. The five
substantive requirements are: (1) Patentable subject matter (section 101); (2) originality (sections
101, 115); (3) novelty (sections 101, 102); (4) utility (section 101); and (5) non-obviousness
(section 103). Id. The four procedural requirements are: (1) An application filed with the
patent office by the inventor or his representative (sections 111, 115, 116, 117, 118); (2) an
application filed within one year of the public use or publication of the invention (section
102(b)); (3) an application filed with a specification containing a "written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains. . . to make
and use the same" (sections 112, 113, 114); and (4) an application filed with one or more
claims "pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter" which constitutes the invention,
and no more (section 112). Id.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (this statute describes what is patentable subject matter).
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. The term "process" means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).
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Computer programs3 have never been held to be per se unpatentable
subject matter.4 However, no court has been willing to grant patent
protection to a computer program in and of itself.5 Instead, computer
programs have been patented only when utilized in conjunction with
other apparatus to effectuate some tangible purpose, such as a
manufacturing process.
6
Since the early 1980's, the Patent and Trademark Office has
granted patents to computer programs that carry out automated
business functions.7 These systems are commonly referred to as
Management Information Systems (MIS)." Patents on MIS are unu-
sual because the computer programs involved do not include appa-
ratus in the customary sense, 9 but rather more closely resemble
3. A computer program is "[a] set of instructions or steps [in machine readable form]
that tells a computer exactly how to handle a complete problem." Novick & Wallenstein, The
Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7
RUTGERS J. ComiTERs, TEcH. & L. 313, 313 n.2 (1979) (quoting SnP'ia & SIPPLE, ComPutER
DiCIoNARY & HANBOOK 339 (2d ed. 1972)).
4. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (holding that the decision therein
does not preclude patents for all programs servicing computers). See also infra notes 75-84
and accompanying text (for a complete discussion of the case).
5. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1981) (holding that rubber molding
process was patentable subject matter notwithstanding that in several of its steps it included
use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (holding that a computer-aided method for updating alarm limits in a
catalytic conversion process, in which the only novel feature was a mathematical formula, was
not patentable subject matter under 35 United States Code section 101); Gottschalk, 409 U.S.
at 71-72 (holding that a formula for converting binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numbers was not patentable because such formula had no substantial application except in
connection with a digital computer, and the effect of such a patent would be the preemption
of all uses of the mathematical formula). See also Report, Patents on Programs? The Supreme
Court Says No, 13 Julum ucs J. 135, 136 (1973) (quoting Duggan, Patents on Computer
Programs? (Prater and Wei), Comm. Assoc. FOR CoimunNo MACHINERY 589 (Oct. 1969)) ("A
close reading of the ... language leads to the conclusion that, while [a] particular machine
or device may well be patentable, a computer program per se is not susceptible of patenting
in and of itself"). Id.
6. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1981) (holding that a mathematical
formula by itself is not subject to patent protection. However, when a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies it in a structure or process which, if considered
as a whole, is performing a function designed to be protected by the patent laws, the claim
constitutes patentable subject matter). The process in Diehr involved the curing of synthetic
rubber. Id.
7. See United States Patent No. 4,346,442; Securities Brokerage-Cash Management
System, inventor Thomas E. Musmanno, Patent Application No. 173,331, filed July 29, 1980,
granted August 24, 1982. The invention consists of data processing of an improved securities
brokerage/cash management system which supervises, implements and coordinates a margin
securities brokerage account; participation in one or more short term money market or
comparable funds; and subscriber-initiated use of electronically responsive subscriber identity
credit/debit media and/or checking systems. Id.
8. See Betts, Patenting the MIS Strategic Edge, COMPUTERWORLD MAO., May 30, 1988,
at I.
9. Customarily, computer programs have received patents only when used as a component
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computer programs in isolation.'0
Initially, this comment will discuss the legislative development of
the patent laws, and the statutory requirements for patenting inven-
tions." Second, this comment will review the controlling case law
that interprets the patent laws as they pertain to computer related
inventions.' 2 Third, this comment discusses recent patents that have
been granted to computer systems known as MIS, 3 and considers
the patentability of these inventions in light of case precedents and
congressional intent.' 4 This comment then concludes that the interests
of the patent system would be better served if MIS were not viewed
as patentable subject matter. Lastly, this comment proposes simple
guidelines to aid in the efficient administration of the patenting of
computer related inventions.'s
I. STATUTORY LAW
Article 1, section 8, of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 6 Pur-
suant to this authority, Congress enacted the patent and copyright
statutes; Titles 35 and 17 of the United States Code, respectively.' 7
Copyright protection prohibits the unauthorized reproduction
8 of
certain subject matter,' 9 but does not prevent others from using
of some larger tangible process or invention. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178-
80 (1981) (invention was a rubber molding process which utilized a computer to calculate
proper cure time); In re Berhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (invention was a
computer assisted drafting process which automatically made two-dimensional portrayals from
three-dimensional objects); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1378-80 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (invention
was a computer-enhanced scientific instrument).
10. See Betts, Patenting the MIS Strategic Edge, COmpUTERWORLD MAG., May 30, 1988,
at I (suggesting that MIS inventions are essentially computer programs).
11. See infra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 34-136 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 167-277 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. A. MILLER & M. DAvIs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COP-
YRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 7-9, 280-81 (1983).
18. Reproduction can be by copies or phonorecords, or by public performance or display.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
19. Subject matter for a copyright includes literature, music, drama, pantomime, chore-
ography, pictures, graphics, sculptures, motion pictures and sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (1988).
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inventive concepts contained therein. 20 Patents, in contrast, protect
inventive concepts themselves, and thus offer a greater level of
protection than a copyright.2' Patents, however, are effective for
only seventeen years, 22 while copyrights protect the subject matter
for the life of the author plus fifty years.
2
1
For an invention to be patentable it must meet five substantive
requirements which are set out in the patent statute.24 First, the
subject matter of the invention must be appropriate for patent
protection (the "subject matter" or "section 101 requirement").
2
1
Second, the applicant must be the first inventor of the subject matter
claimed (the "originality requirement"). 26 Third, the invention must
be novel. 27 Fourth, the invention must be useful (the "utility require-
ment"). 28 Lastly, a patentable invention must demonstrate a mean-
ingful departure or advancement from previously existing technology
(the "non-obviousness requirement") .29
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The statute states that "[in no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). "[v]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any
patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent." Id. Patentable subject matter includes inventions such as processes, machines,
manufactures, compositions of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1952).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1980) (stating that "[e]very patent shall contain a short title of the
invention and grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years,
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention").
23. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976) (stating that a "[c]opyright in a work created on or after
January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and ... endures for a term consisting of the life
of the author and fifty years after the author's death").
24. See generally E. KrTcH & H. PERLmAN, LEGAL REoULAnON OF THE CoMpEnTrVE
PROCESS 747 (3d ed. 1986); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952-86).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (stating that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvements thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title"). See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that
respondent's method for converting numerical information from binary-coded decimal numbers
into pure binary numbers did not qualify as patentable subject matter); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (holding respondent's method for updating alarm limits in a catalytic
conversion process was not patentable subject matter).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (providing that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor") (emphasis added); id. § 115 (1982) (providing
that "[t]he applicant shall make [an] oath that he believes himself to be the original and first
inventor of the process").
27. Id. § 101 (1982) (providing that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, . . . may obtain a patent therefor") (emphasis added); id. § 102 (1982) (setting out
several requirements to ensure invention was not previously known or used).
28. Id. § 101 (providing that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process
... may obtain a patent therefor") (emphasis added).
29. Id. § 103 (1982) providing that:
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If an invention meets these substantive requirements, the applicant
must file a timely application with the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), setting forth a detailed description of the claimed invention. 0
If the PTO determines that the invention conforms to all statutory
requirements, a patent will issue." Unfavorable judgments by the
PTO may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (formerly the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)).1
2
Final appeal may be heard before the Supreme Court.
33
II. CASE LAW
A. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Mental
Steps Doctrine
The majority of cases challenging the patentability of computer
programs or computer related inventions have premised non-patent-
ability on the grounds that computer related inventions do not fall
into any of the categories of permissible subject matter described in
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains ....
[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention is made.
Id.
30. E. KrrcHi & H. PERAN, LEGAL REGUL.ATION OF = Com, rrrVw PRocEss 747 (3d
ed. 1986). To provide sufficient detail, an application must contain a "written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to
make and use the same . . . " 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). To be timely, an application must be
filed within one year of the public use or publication of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1982).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1982) (providing that "[t]he Commissioner shall cause an examination
to be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it
appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue
a patent therefor"); id. § 151 (1982) (providing that "[i]f it appears that applicant is entitled
to a patent under the law, a written notice of allowance of the application shall be given or
mailed to the applicant ... [u]pon payment of this sum the patent shall issue").
32. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1982) (providing that "lain applicant dissatisfied with the decision
of the Board of Appeals may appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal
Circuit"). See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982). As of October 1, 1982 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit came into
existence through the merger of the U.S. Court of Claims and the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. Id. The new court has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from
both the federal district courts and the Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988) (The Supreme Court may review cases from the courts of
appeals by certiorari or by certification of a court of appeal).
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section 101 of the patent statute.3 4 Categories of patentable subject
matter include processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. 5 Inventors
generally attempt to classify their computer related inventions as
"processes" for section 101 purposes.3 6
Early consideration of section 101 as applied to computer programs
and computer related inventions led to what was known as the mental
steps doctrine.3 7 The mental steps doctrine prohibited the patenting
of inventions whose novelty was contained in steps to be performed
in the human mind. 38 The doctrine was based on the broadly inter-
preted but well-settled principle of patent law that laws of nature,
scientific principles, and mere ideas are not patentable subject mat-
ter.39 Because mathematical algorithms40 have been construed as syn-
34. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 180 (1981) (patent examiner rejected
patent claim on computer related invention solely on subject matter grounds); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (holding that patentability of computer related invention turned solely
on the proper construction of 35 United States Code section 101).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
36. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Bernhart, 417
F.2d 1395, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 888 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
37. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (suggesting that the genesis
of the mental steps doctrine in patent law was Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1932)).
38. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166-67 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
39. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (14 How. 1852) (principle that lead, under high
pressure, can be made to form a pipe held unpatentable); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (15
How. 1853) (claims to broad uses of electromagnetism held unpatentable); Rubber-Tip Pencil
Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (20 Wall. 1874) (fastening a rubber eraser to the end of a pencil
held unpatentable because it is an idea); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
306 U.S. 86 (1938) (scientific truth, or mathematical expression of it, is not patentable); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1947) (law of nature not patentable). In
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the principle was explained as follows:
[W]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be ... [A]n idea of itself is not patentable ... [A] principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right ... Phenomena
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work
... [H]e who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to
a monopoly of it which the law recognizes ... [I]f there is to be invention from
such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new
and useful end.
Id. at 67.
40. The Supreme Court defines the term "algorithm" as a procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65. Cf., Paine Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Del.
1983) (distinguishing between "math algorithm," which is a procedure for solving a given type
of mathematical problem, and a "computer algorithm"). A computer algorithm is:
1) A fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a simplified
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onymous with scientific principles,4' the patent courts have routinely
denied patents to applications which consist of mathematical algo-
rithms. 42 In a similar vein, the patent courts have denied patents to
computer inventions which do no more than embody and execute a
mathematical equation.
43
Eventually the CCPA took a less hostile posture towards inventions
which included, but did not entirely consist of, mental processes or
mathematical algorithms. 4 Beginning in 1968 with the decision of In
re Prater,45 and culminating in 1970 with the decision of In re
Musgrave,46 the CCPA ruled on a series of cases which shifted
emphasis away from the question of mental steps, and concentrated
on whether or not the invention pursued the constitution's stated
purpose of pursuing the "useful arts."' 47 This shift of emphasis greatly
overshadowed consideration of the mental steps doctrine, and intro-
duced new questions which ultimately spawned disagreement between
the CCPA and the Supreme Court.48
1. In re Prater
In In re Prater, the patent applicant had discovered a mathematical
relationship involving the peaks in a spectrographic 9 array, which
procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number
of steps.
2) A defined process or set of rules that leads [sic] and assures development of a
desired output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and/or algebraic/logical
steps to calculate or determine a given task; processing rules.
Id. (quoting from C. SIPPLE & C. Sn'PLE, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 23 (2d ed.
1975)). The Court implies that the "math algorithm" is the correct definition to be employed
in considering the patentability of subject matter under 35 United States Code section 101.
Paine Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1367.
41. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)
("[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention,
a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.").
42. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 167 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (novelty of invention
existed in mathematical expression and was therefore nonstatutory subject matter); Arshal v.
United States, 621 F.2d 421, 428-30 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (claim which mathematically treated input
signals to produce useful output signals was held nonstatutory subject matter).
43. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972) (computer program which
converted binary-coded decimals into pure binary numbers was held unpatentable subject
matter).
44. See infra notes 49-74 and accompanying text.
45. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968) modified on rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
46. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
47. Id. at 893.
48. See infra, notes 75-107 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's reversal
of CCPA decisions regarding patents on computer inventions).
49. A spectrograph is an instrument for dispersing radiation (as electromagnetic radiation
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made possible a more accurate determination of the constituents in
a gaseous mixture.50 The patent application in Prater also disclosed
an invention to carry out this mathematical discovery.
51
The Patent Examiner rejected the patent application in Prater, in
part because the claim relied upon the execution of a math algorithm
which was "readable upon a mental process; and claims to a mental
process are unpatentable. ' 5 2 Specifically, the invention in Prater
utilized an analog computer 53 to carry out the math algorithm, and
the Patent Examiner reasoned that utilization of a machine to carry
out mental operations did not immunize the invention from unpa-
tentability under the mental steps doctrine.
5 4
The CCPA reversed the patent examiner's decision in Prater,
holding that a machine used to carry out a process that was formerly
carried out by mental steps is not unpatentable as long as the process
is directed at a "useful art" within the intendment of the constitu-
tion. 55 The CCPA further defined the patent laws as they pertain to
the use of math algorithms and mental steps in In re Bernhart1
6
decided one year after Prater.
5 7
or sound waves) into a spectrum and photographing or mapping the spectrum. WEBSTER'S
NEw NnI H COLLEGiATE DICTIONARY 1133 (1984).
50. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1378-80 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
51. Id. at 1379.
52. Id. at 1381. The other grounds used by the Patent Examiner for rejection were section
102 (novelty), section 103 (nonobviousness), and section 112 (lack of specificity). Id.
53. An analog computer is any class of device in which variable physical quantities such
as electrical potential, fluid pressure, or mechanical motion are represented in a way analogous
to the corresponding quantities in the problem to be solved. THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRiTANNiCA 7 (15th ed. 1985). Analog computers use changes in mechanical, electrical, or
other physical properties to represent changes in input data. Id. See also C. MnLA, LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA 11 (1985).
Different numbers may be represented, for example, by different voltages and those
voltage levels (and thus the corresponding numbers) may be continuously variable.
A digital computer, however, operates in discrete steps and stores data as simply
the presence or absence of a signal of some kind. Bender explains the essential
difference of approach thus: Whereas analog computers function in terms of "how
much," digital computers function in terms of "how many"; analog computers
measure, while digital computers count.
Id.
54. In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1381. The Patent Examiner relied on In re Abrams, 188
F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951), which held that if the novelty of an invention lies in a math
algorithm the invention is nonstatutory, as the basis for rejection under the mental steps
doctrine. Id. In overturning the Patent Examiner, the CCPA distinguished Abrams because
the invention at issue in Abrams disclosed no means other than the mind for performing
calculations and comparisons, and no alternative means existed at that time. Id. at 1389.
Conversely, in Prater, alternative means did exist and were well described in the patent
application. Id. at 1385.
55. Id. at 1389.
56. 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
57. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (describing the holding in Bernhart).
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2. In re Bernhart
The invention at issue in In re Bernhart employed a computer-
calculated math algorithm and a mechanical plotting machine which
acted together to generate two-dimensional portrayals of three-di-
mensional objects from any desired angle and distance and on any
desired plane of projection." After finding the invention patentable,
the Bernhart court suggested that the mental steps doctrine only
precluded the complete monopolization of all uses of a math algo-
rithm. 9 The court also stated that if an invention discloses a means
other than the human mind for carrying out the math algorithm, the
question of the mental steps exclusion does not even ariseA0 Fur-
thermore, if a patent-claim to a process includes a mathematical
expression as its sole novel component, the claim is not unpatentable
simply because the remaining components are old.," The Bernhart
court concluded that because the invention at issue disclosed a means
for carrying out the algorithm, the issue of the mental steps doctrine
did not arise. 62
Bernhart signalled the downfall of the mental steps doctrine. One
year after Bernhart, the CCPA decided In re Musgrave,63 which made
the mental steps doctrine essentially obsolete.6
3. In re Musgrave
The invention in Musgrave allowed an operator to determine, with
a high degree of accuracy, the nature of sub-surface formations in
the earth's crust. 65 The invention utilized an analog computer to
58. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
59. Id. at 1399 (holding that no rule of law should be announced which would impress
a monopoly upon all uses of the equations disclosed by appellants in their application).
60. Id. at 1400.' "It would appear that the disclosure of apparatus for performing the
process wholly without human intervention, merely shows that the disclosed process does not
fall within the so-called 'mental steps' exclusion." Id. (citing Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1403
(C.C.P.A. 1969)).
61. Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1399.
62. Id. at 1400-01.
63. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
64. See id. at 890-94.
65. Id. at 882.
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perform mathematical operations. 66 The PTO rejected the application,
citing the mental steps doctrine. 67
The CCPA, in overturning the PTO's decision, pointed out that
nothing in congressional or other statutory language established the
mental steps doctrine6 8 but rather that such doctrine was conceived
from uncertain case law. 69 The Musgrave court concluded that "all
that is necessary ... to make a sequence of operational steps a
statutory process within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be within the
technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional
purpose to promote the 'useful arts.' ' 70 This decision shifted the
focus of analysis away from mental steps considerations and thus,
after Musgrave was decided in 1970, the mental steps doctrine did
not again pose a serious obstacle to the patentability of inventions
containing mathematical equations or computer programs.7' This
liberal interpretation of section 101 by the CCPA was not shared by
the Supreme Court, however.72 The Supreme Court was slower to
embrace the general idea of patents for computer related inventions
and eventually expressed clear disagreement with the CCPA in their
review of CCPA decisions .7  The first case to finally reach the
66. Id. at 887.
67. Id. at 888.
68. Id. at 890.
69. Id. at 890-92.
70. Id. at 893. "Technological arts" were never defined by the court in Musgrave. Judge
Baldwin, concurring in Musgrave, foresaw the following:
First and foremost will be the problem of interpreting the meaning of "technological
arts": Is this term intended to be synonymous with the "industrial technology"-
mentioned by Judge Smith? It sounds broader to me. Necessarily, this will have to
be considered a question of law and decided on a case-by-case basis. Promulgation
of any all-encompassing definition has to be impossible. This task is now before us.
Id. at 895 (Baldwin, J., concurring). See In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A.
1972) (the term "technological arts" is synonymous with the term "useful arts" as it is used
in the Constitution); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (the term "industrial technology" is
synonymous with the term "useful art" as it is used in the Constitution).
71. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 894-95 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (stating that very
little remains of the mental steps doctrine).
72. See infra notes 75-107 and accompanying text (Supreme Court overruled decisions by
the C.C.P.A. on section 101 grounds). See also In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 894 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (an example of the liberal interpretation by the C.C.P.A. of
section 101). Judge Baldwin believed that no limitations were placed on this holding, and that
in effect, it was a pronouncement of new law. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring).
73. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978) (both Supreme Court decisions overruled CCPA decisions granting patents to computer
related inventions on the grounds that they would preempt the use of a mathematical formula).
See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
commented that the CCPA had been critical of previous Supreme Court decisions in the area
of computer related patents, and had accused the Supreme Court of erroneously commingling
distinct statutory provisions. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further commented
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Supreme Court on the issue of computer related invention patenta-
bility was Gottschalk v. Benson.7 4
B. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Gottschalk v. Benson
In In re Benson,7  the CCPA found patentable a method of
programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals
from binary-coded decimal form to pure binary form.76 The CCPA
reasoned that it was beyond question that the computing machines
themselves were considered "useful art," regardless of the uses to
which they were put.77 The CCPA further reasoned that a program
which enhanced the internal operation of a computer would likewise
be in the technological or useful arts.78
The Supreme Court overruled the decision of the CCPA.79 The
Court held that granting the patent at issue would have the practical
effect of patenting an idea, because the patent-seekers had failed to
limit the scope of the application of their invention. 0 Since the
invention had no practical application other than in connection with
a digital computer, the Court deduced that such a patent would have
the effect of preempting the mathematical formula used, thereby
amounting to a patent on the algorithm itself.8'
Although this was the first opportunity the Supreme Court had to
speak on the issue of computer program patentability, the Court
declined to set out clear standards in this area. Instead, the Court
merely described what is not unpatentable.8 2 The Court expressly left
that the CCPA had expressly declined to use a method of claim analysis spelled out in a prior
Supreme Court decision. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
75. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
76. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Most digital computers perform
their computing operations on information represented in pure binary form. Pure binary form
can represent any decimal number as a combination of O's and l's. The mathematical operation
necessary to convert a normal decimal number into a binary number requires that the decimal
number be first converted into a "binary coded decimal." Id. at 682-83:
77. Id. at 688.
78. Id.
79. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id. at 71-72.
82. Id. at 71. The Court stated that "[w]e do not hold that no process patent could ever
qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents." Id.
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open the possibility of computer program patentability, but indicated
that such a program did not exist in the Benson case.83 The next
opportunity the Supreme Court had to address the issue of computer
related invention patentability came in Parker v. Flook.
8 4
2. Parker v. Flook
The applicant in Flook claimed to have discovered a "method for
updating alarm limits" in catalytic conversion processes. 5 Specifi-
cally, when a catalytic conversion process takes place, certain reaction
variables are monitored, e.g., temperature. 86 If the value for a
reaction variable exceeds a predetermined "alarm limit," a signal is
dispatched to warn of the abnormality. 7 Under certain conditions,
such as non-steady-state operation, 88 it is appropriate to change the
value of the alarm limits. 89 The invention in Flook monitored the
reaction variable and a computer calculated a new value for the
variable and adjusted the alarm limit appropriately. 90 The CCPA
approved the patent, holding that the "post solution activity," that
activity which took place after the computer utilized the math algo-
rithm, limited the application of the algorithm; since approving the
patent would not result in preemption of the algorithm altogether,
the invention was outside the authority of Benson.91
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CCPA, holding
that regardless of the presence of a math algorithm, the process
simply exhibited no patentable invention. 92 The Court reasoned that
83. Id. The court stated that "[it is said that the decision precludes a patent for any
program servicing a computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we have before us a program
for a digital computer but extend our holding to programs for analog computers. We have,
however, made clear from the start that we deal with a program only for digital computers."
Id.
84. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
85. Id. at 585.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Steady state is "[a] characteristic of a condition, such as value, rate, periodicity, or
amplitude, exhibiting only negligible change over an arbitrary long period of time. It may
describe a condition in which some characteristics are static; others dynamic." VA NOSTRANDS'S
ScmtrEnsc ENCYCLOPEDrA 2087 (5th ed. 1976).
89. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 590. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding an invention not
to be patentable subject matter because it would result in wholly preempting a mathematical
algorithm).
92. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
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because an algorithm must be utilized in some inventive manner to
be patentable, the mere discovery of an algorithm remains unpatent-
able unless applied in an inventive way. 93 The Court found the
requisite "inventive concept" wanting in the Flook application.
94
The Court concluded by stating that neither its precedents nor the
instant decision should be interpreted to foreclose the possibility of
patent protection being granted for a novel and useful computer
program, or to suggest that such protection is undesirable as a matter
of policy. 95 However, the Court recognized that it "must proceed
cautiously when asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforseen by Congress." ' 96 The Flook Court indicated that for an
applicant to successfully obtain a patent under section 101 for an
invention containing a math algorithm, the applicant must show more
than a mere lack of total preemption of the algorithm.97 Additionally,
the applicant must show some "inventive concept." 98
Justice Stewart, writing for the dissent, asserted that the patent
application satisfied the requirement of section 101, which addresses
the subject matter of the invention. 99 According to the dissent, the
majority was denying the application on section 102 and 103 grounds,
but was improperly classifying the rejection as being based on section
101 criteria. 10°
The CCPA did not attach great significance to the Flook "inventive
concept" requirement in their subsequent review of computer related
patent applications.101 In fact, the CCPA continued to employ a pre-
Flook test first articulated in In re Freeman, when evaluating com-
93. Id. at 594. "Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be
well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery
of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept
in its application." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 595.
96. Id. at 596.
97. Id. at 594.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra note 25 (describing the subject
matter requirement for patentabilty).
100. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart
suggested that the requirements of sections 101, 102, and 103 (subject matter. novelty, and
non-obviousness, respectively) should be addressed individually, rather than jumbling them
together, as the majority did in this case. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Reviewing the present
invention against section 101 requirements only, the dissent found the invention to pass muster.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 811-13 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d
982, 985-89 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In both these cases, the CCPA evaluated the inventions under
35 United States Code section 101 and held that all passed the necessary requirements without
mention of the "inventiveness" requirement articulated in Flook. Id.
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puter related inventions under section 101 .'1 The CCPA test involved
a two-step analysis:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly
recites an algorithm in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim
which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt
an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascer-
tain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm. 03
Utilizing this test, the CCPA continued, post-Flook, to grant
patents to inventions which made use of computers. 104 In March
1980, the Supreme Court agreed to review two such cases; In re
Diehr'0 5 and In re Bradley.' 6 Because of subsequent structural changes
in the court system, these cases may be the last opinions by the
Supreme Court on the issue of computer related patents.?°
3. Diamond v. Diehr
The invention sought to be patented in Diamond v. Diehr'0 was
strikingly analogous to the invention in Flook.'°9 The patent claim
102. See In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 988.
103. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245. "Directly" refers to the recitation of a conventional
math formula, and "indirectly" refers to words which in effect describe a math formula. Id.
at 1246. The phrase "the Benson sense of the term" refers to a procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65. See also Gemignani,
Should Algorithms be Patentable?, 22 Jurmamics J. 326 (1982) (stating that the two-part
Freeman test was first articulated by the CCPA in In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
104. See In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982,
988-89 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
105. 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980), aff'd 450 U.S. 173
(1981).
106. 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980), aff'd without
opinion, 450 U.S. 381 (1981). The Supreme Court heard arguments in the Diehr and Bradley
cases on the same day, Oct 14, 1980, deciding the Diehr case first in a lengthy opinion, then
affirming the CCPA's Bradley decision without opinion at 450 U.S. 381 (1981). Because the
Bradley decision has no opinion, it is not mentioned hereafter.
107. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
As of October 1, 1982, the CCPA and the United States Court of Claims merged to form a
new patent appeals court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This
new court has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals, from both the Federal District
Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. See also Samuels, The Patentability of
Computer Related Inventions, 6 CoRP. L. Ray. 144, 155 (1983). Samuels expresses the opinion
that due to the specialized nature of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court will act with extreme deference, and will not likely address the
issue of computer related invention patentability again. Id.
108. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
109. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). In Flook, the invention at issue monitored the
variables involved in a catalytic conversion process, and altered the operating parameters,
(alarm limits), when appropriate. Id. at 585. In Diehr, the invention monitored a rubber
molding process and altered the "time-to-cure" as a function of the interior temperature of
the mold. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176.
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was entitled Direct Digital Control of Rubber Molding Process,110
and involved the use of a computer program to improve the per-
formance of rubber molding processes by accurately calculating the
ideal cure time."' The invention constantly measured the interior
temperature of a mold and fed this information to a computer, which
continually recalculated the cure time by use of a well known
mathematical equation.1 12 When the recalculated time equalled the
actual cure time, the computer signalled a device to open the mold."'
The Diehr opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist (who dissented in
Flook), began by reciting section 101.14 The Court then found that
the invention at issue fell into the "process" category of section
101.115 Further, the Court stated that the patentability of such a
process should be considered with respect to Congress' intent that
statutory subject matter includes "anything under the sun that is
made by man.1 116 The opinion then set out language which defined
the nature of a patentable process, the significance of which warrants
its full reproduction.
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular
form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed .... A
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state
or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of
machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The
machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or
may not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be
altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. The process
requires that certain things should be done with certain substances,
and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may
be of secondary consequence. Transformation of an article to a
110. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
111. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-79. The computer is provided with temperature
data from the mold, and then uses the temperature data in a mathematical equation to calculate
the "updated cure time." Id.
112. Id. The well known equation is called an Arrhenius equation and is named after its
discoverer, Svante Arrhenius. The mathematical expression of the equation is: [In v = CZ +
x]. In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; C is the activation constant;
Z is the temperature of the mold, and x is a constant which depends on the geometry of the
mold. Id. at 178 n.2.
113. Id. at 178-79.
114. Id. at 182.
115. Id. at 185.
116. Id. at 183. The opinion was quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952);
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CONG. & ADIUN.
NEws 2394, 2399. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
different state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines." 7
Utilizing the above description, the Court held that the invention
at issue satisfied the requirements of patentable subject matter."8 The
Court reasoned that the invention indisputably transformed an article,
uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing." 9 Further-
more, the Court stated that "industrial processes such as this are the
types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection
of our patent laws.' ' 20
The Court then distinguished its previous holdings in Benson and
Flook, on the grounds that the applications in those cases essentially
recited and preempted all uses of a mathematical formula.'2, Math-
ematical formulas, like laws of nature, are not patentable. 2 Because
of, the factual similarities between the Flook and Diehr inventions,
the Court, whose membership had not changed in the interim period,
had a difficult time distinguishing Flook.23 The Court's opinion in
Diehr admitted that arguably the claims in Flook did more than
recite a mathematical formula. 12 In light of this admission, the
statement made by the Court in Flook, that the claims therein did
not preempt all uses of the math algorithm,'21 seems to support the
conclusion that Flook was wrongly decided. However, the Court in
Diehr asserted that the invention in Flook was factually distinguish-
able from the invention in Diehr, and thus Flook was still valid
law. 126 The Court in Diehr did not mention "inventiveness," and
thus seemed to invalidate the suggestion made by the Flook Court
that questions of "inventiveness" should be introduced into a section
101 inquiry. 27
The Court concluded without reciting any formal test for reviewing
patent applications which contain computer programs or math al-
gorithms, but by setting forth general principles to be considered in
117. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182-84.
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 185-87.
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id. at 186-87. See also supra note 109 (describing the factual similarities between the
inventions in Flook and Diehr).
124. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14.
125. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
126. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-88.
127. Id. at 189-90 (no mention of the "inventive concept" requirement is discussed).
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the evaluation of such patent applications. 12 The Court asserted that
the use of a computer, computer program, or mathematical formula
in an invention does not automatically bar the invention from pat-
entability. 129 However, the invention must apply the computer or
formula in a useful manner which deserves the protection of the
patent laws: that is to say, the invention must be "otherwise statu-
tory."' 130 Furthermore, when considering applications for patents on
processes the process should be evaluated in its entirety, and not
dissected into new and old elements, because even a new combination
of old elements may be patentable. 3 1 The Court concluded by indi-
cating in dicta that the two-step procedure set out in the Freeman
test 132 was appropriate for claims reciting a mathematical formula,
but because no formula existed in the case at issue, the test was
unnecessary. 13
3
Justice Stevens, in a four justice dissent, attacked the majority's
disregard for the "distinction between the subject matter of what the
inventor claims to have discovered-the section 101 issue-and the
question whether that claimed discovery is in fact novel-the section
128. Id. at 187-91.
129. Id. at 187. The Court stated that its earlier opinions lent support to its present
conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonsta-
tutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.
Id.
130. Id. at 187-88. "It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection." Id. at 187. "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be [citing Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306
U.S. 86, 94 (1939)]." Id. at 188.
131. Id. at 188. The Court stated that:
[i]n determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection
under section 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate
to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of
the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because
a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the
constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the
combination was made.
Id.
132. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (articulatiing the Freeman test).
133. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-93. The Court stated:
[w]e recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or
scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether
the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... Because
we do not view respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula,
but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products,
we affirm the judgement of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Id.
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102 issue.' ' i3 4 The dissent suggested that the Court should make a
firm ruling that no computer related invention should qualify for
patentability if the invention relies entirely on the use of a com-
puter. 35 In addition, the dissent criticized the majority's opinion and
the precedents set by the Court because they fail to provide workable
guidelines for patent attorneys to evaluate computer related inven-
tions, and to determine in a predictable manner the patentability of
such inventions.
36
III. TiE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM PATENT
A. Background
The term "Management Information System," (MIS), has a flex-
ible meaning, and has been used to describe computer controlled
systems which perform functions ranging from the preparation of an
inventory report showing updated ending balances, to the simulation
of how new products will fare in complex marketing environments. 1
3
The strict definition of the term varies depending on the source.
38
134. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 211. See also E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEOAL REouLATION OF
THE COMPETITrVE PROCESS 793 (3d ed. 1986).
It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. Presum-
ably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring to any "new and
useful" process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the
type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection "subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." Specific conditions for patentability follow and §
102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of
whether a particular invention is novel is "fully apart from whether the invention
falls into a category of statutory subject matter."
Id. (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
135. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens declared:
I believe ... concerns would be better addressed by (1) an unequivocal holding that
no program-related invention is a patentable process under § 101 unless it makes a
contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the utilization of a computer,
and (2) an unequivocal explanation that the term "algorithm" as used in this case,
as in Benson and Flook, is synonymous with the term "computer program."
Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
136. Id. (Stevens J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that:
the cases considering the patentability of program-related inventions do not establish
rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair degree of
accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be patentable.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. J. KANTER, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS ix (3d ed. 1984).
138. See, e.g., G. DAvis, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS,
STRUCTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT vii (1974) ("[a] management information system, or MIS, is
an information system that, in addition to providing all necessary transaction processing for
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However, a conveniently brief articulation was offered by James
Hicks: "A management information system is a formalized, com-
puter-based system able to integrate data from various sources to
provide the information necessary for management decision mak-
ing.'''
39
Because computer programs have traditionally qualified for copy-
right protection only, the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v.
Diehr was enthusiastically received by many companies and indivi-
duals who sought a higher level of protection for their computer
programs and computer related inventions. 140 In an apparent response
to the decision in Diehr, the PTO began to grant patents on inventions
which can generally be described as MIS's.' 4' MIS patents are con-
troversial because they defy the unwritten doctrine that patents are
for tangible inventions such as communication devices and manufac-
turing tools, but not for abstract entities such as data processing
methodology embodied in a computer program.' 42
an organization, provides information and processing support for management and decision
functions"); J. HICKS, JR., MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYsTEMs: A USER PERSPECTIvE 21
(1984) ("management information system is a formalized, computer-based system able to
integrate data from various sources to provide the information necessary for management
decision making"); J. KANTER, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1 (3d ed. 1984) ("an MIS
is a system that aids management in making, carrying out, and controlling decisions").
139. J. HICKS, JR., MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYsTEMs: A USER PERSPECTIVE 21 (1984).
140. M. Betts, Patenting the MIS Strategic Edge, CoMPtrrERwoRLD MAG., May 30, 1988,
at 1. "The trend toward software patents was prompted by the 1981 United States Supreme
Court ruling in Diamond v. Diehr, which opened the floodgates for patenting software-related
inventions such as industrial process control systems, digital telephone switches and robots. In
the last two years there has been a sharp increase in the number of patents issued for automated
systems, patent attorneys said, and more are on the way.) Id. at 10. See also B. DITZ, THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFMARE 117 (1981) (Copyright protection has been available
for computer programs under the old 1909 Act since at least 1964).
141. See, e.g., United States Patent No. 4,346,442: Securities Brokerage-Cash Management
System, inventor Thomas E. Musmanno, Patent Application No. 173,331, filed July 29, 1980,
granted August 24, 1982 (Invention providing data processing methodology and apparatus for
effecting a system which allows automatic transactions between a margin brokerage account,
a money market account, and a charge card account); United States Patent No. 4,736,294:
Data Processing Methods and Apparatus for Managing Vehicle Financing, inventor Gwyneth
Gill, Patent Application No. 65,176, filed June 23, 1987, granted April 5, 1988 (Invention
disclosing data processing system that provides information to assist in granting a loan applicant
credit, processing the loan, and determining at the time of making the loan the residual value
of the vehicle at a predetermined option date); United States Patent No. 4,674,044: Automated
Securities Trading System, inventor Leslie P. Kalmus, Patent Application No. 696,407, filed
January 30, 1985, granted June 16, 1987 (Invention providing data processing and apparatus
to effect automatic trading of securities).
142. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983). The majority in Paine Webber ruled against plaintiff,
who contended that the defendant's computer invention should be unpatentable because it
defines "nothing more than the combination of familiar business systems." Id. at 1365. See
also M. Betts, Patenting the MIS Strategic Edge, CoziPTERwoRLD MAO., May 30, 1988, at
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Consider, for example, the following MIS inventions: United States
Patent No. 4,694,397, entitled Banking/Brokerage Computer Inter-
face System,143 [hereinafter "Banking/Brokerage" invention], and
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,294, entitled Data Processing Methods and
Apparatus for Managing Vehicle Financing,'" [hereinafter "Vehicle
Financing" invention].
The first of these inventions uses a computer and associated
program as an interface between a conventional bank account and a
securities brokerage account.145 The object of the invention is to
facilitate automatic transactions between the two accounts, and to
create independent and separate transactional activity records. 46 Spe-
cifically, the invention makes possible automatic transactions that
would normally require human intervention. For example, if a user
desires to buy securities, he need not make a trip to the bank to
secure the funding. The user merely places an order with the bro-
kerage house and the invention automatically transfers funds from
the bank account to the securities account to complete the transac-
tion.147 Conversely, if funds are generated in the securities account,
the invention will automatically transfer the funds for deposit in the
bank account. 148 It is noteworthy that the two accounts may be
located substantial distances from one another, with the communi-
cated data relayed via satellite, overland microwave, or conventional
switched data networks.
49
The second aforementioned MIS invention, the Vehicle Financing
invention, processes vehicle financing data, 50 and provides informa-
tion to assist a lender in granting a loan applicant credit.' The
invention processes the loan, and determines at the time of making
1. "From a legal standpoint, the MIS patents are unusual because they break the conventional
wisdom that patents are for inventions such as mousetraps and zippers, not for computer
software or methods of doing business .. ." Id. at 10.
143. United States Patent No. 4,694,397: Banking/Brokerage Computer Interface System,
inventors David J. Grant and Andrew M. Vignola, Sr., Patent Application No. 686,976, filed
December 27, 1984, granted September 15, 1987.
144. United States Patent No. 4,736,294: Data Processing Methods and Apparatus for
Managing Vehicle Financing, inventor Gwyneth Gill, Patent Application No. 65,176, filed
June 23, 1987, granted April 5, 1988.
145. United States Patent No. 4,694,397, supra note 143, at columns 1-2.
146. Id. at column 1.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at column 3.
150. United States Patent No. 4,736,294: Data Processing Methods and Apparatus for
Managing Vehicle Financing, inventor Gwyneth Gill, Patent Application No. 65,176, filed
June 23, 1987, granted April 5, 1988.
151. Id. in the abstract.
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the loan a residual value of the vehicle at a pre-determined option
date.Y5 2 The patent includes 107 pages of computer programming,
including 10,000 COBOL153 instructions.
5 4
When comparing MIS patents such as the Banking/Brokerage and
Vehicle Financing patents with previous computer related patents, it
is apparent that these MIS patents differ in a qualitative way. 55
Recall the early computer-related invention patented in Prater.156 The
invention in Prater utilized a computer and accompanying program
to analyze data generated from a spectrograph. 157 Thus although the
invention made use of a computer program, the use of which was
controversial under the then-viable mental steps doctrine, 5 8 the com-
puter component enhanced the operation of a scientific instrument.1
59
In this way, the patent on the invention seemed proper in view of
the stated purpose of the Constitution: To promote the progress of
science and useful arts.1
6
Similarly, the invention in Bernhart involved the use of a computer
and accompanying program to analyze data representative of three-
dimensional images.' 6' The invention altered this data to generate
data representative of a corresponding two dimensional image, and
then generated this image by use of a mechanical plotter. 6 2 Because
this invention included apparatus (a plotter) to effectuate its purpose,
the invention was found to recite statutory subject matter notwith-
standing its computer component.
6 3
The Prater and Bernhart inventions differ from MIS inventions
because the former contain significant components other than the
computer related component. 64 Contrast these with the aformen-
152. Id.
153. COBOL is a computer language commonly utilized in business applications. RADE-
HACHER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CoMPUTERs "D INFoRMATION SYsTEMs 547 (1983). (COBOL
stands for Common Business Oriented Language). "First used in 1960, today it is the most
widely used computer language for business applications in both medium-size and large
organizations." Id.
154. See United States Patent No. 4,736,294, supra note 141.
155. M. Betts, Patenting the MIS Strategic Edge, COMPtTERWORLD MAG., May 30, 1988,
at 10.
156. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968). See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying
text (describing the invention in Prater).
157. In re Prater,' 415 F.2d at 1378-81.
158. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (describing the mental steps doctrine).
159. In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1380.
160. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
161. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1401.
164. See id. (planar plotting apparatus); In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1379 (complex config-
uration of components to carry out spectrographic analysis).
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tioned MIS inventions. The Banking/Brokerage invention's inventive
substance lies primarily in the computer and accompanying program
used to interface the banking and brokerage accounts. 6 Similarly,
the Vehicle Financing invention, with its 107 pages of computer
programming, seems obviously to consist predominantly of program-
ming methodology, and in this respect it is a significant departure
from Diehr and its predecessors. 16
B. Do Diehr and its Predecessors Lay the Precedential
Foundation for the Patenting of Management Information
Systems?
1. Computer Programs
The determination of whether MIS inventions are deserving of
patent protection depends, of course, on the nature of what exactly
is claimed in the particular invention at issue. 6 7 Assuming for the
sake of analysis that MIS inventions are more computer program
than apparatus, we may proceed to scrutinize the propriety of grant-
ing patents to these inventions. It is interesting to note that the
descriptions of the inventions in MIS patents invariably describe the
invention to include apparatus. 68 This style of draftsmanship is likely
employed to downplay the computer part of the invention in an
effort to avoid a Benson-like patent denial. 1
69
In analyzing the case law to ascertain the appropriateness of
granting patents to MIS's, it is discouraging to discover that the
PTO, the patent courts, and Congress have been loath to express
any collective and coherent consensus on the requirements or limits
165. See United States Patent No. 4,694,397, supra note 143, at sheets 1-6 (computer
flowcharts show methodology of the invention).
166. See supra notes 49-136 and accompanying text (Diehr and its predecessors allowed
computer related inventions to be patented only if apparatus accompanied the computer
component).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (section 101 describes patentable subject matter).
168. See, e.g., United States Patent No. 4,736,294, supra note 141, in the abstract ("Data
processing methods and apparatus for managing vehicle financing are disclosed.")(emphasis
added); United States Patent No. 4,674,044, supra note 141, in the abstract ("Data processing
based apparatus makes an automated trading market for one or more securities.")(emphasis
added); United States Patent No. 4,642,768 in the abstract ("Methods and apparatus for
funding a future liability by means of an insurance investment program.") (emphasis added).
169. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (describing the denial in Benson).
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of computer related patents.1 70 Instead, patent practitioners are forced
to interpret a history of cases lacking consistency in both reasoning
and results, and which one commentator aptly describes as twisted
and convoluted.
171
Despite the inconsistencies, there is authority from both the CCPA
and the Supreme Court to suggest that not only MIS computer
programs, but any computer program may, under appropriate con-
ditions, be granted patent protection.' 72 Unfortunately, the opinions
fail to clearly state these conditions.' 73 Consider the plain language
of the Supreme Court in Benson: "It is said that the decision
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not
so hold."' 7 4 The Supreme Court affirmed this language six years later
in Flook, and added that patents on computer related inventions
were not undesirable as a matter of policy.
17
Despite the fact that computer related inventions, including MIS
inventions, are not per se unpatentable, many such inventions have
failed to satisfy the requisite conditions required for patentability.
1 76
One relatively clear ground relied on by the courts for rejection of
170. See Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View From '79, 7
RUTGERS J. Coz, UrEas, TECH. & L. 269, 292 (1980) stating that:
[t]he plot has all of the elements of a comic opera with four principle characters:
the Patent Office, which steadfastly turns down every application for a patent on a
computer program; the court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which has fought for
program patents in the face of increasing opposition from the Supreme Court; the
Supreme Court, itself confused and trying to apply "nineteenth century legal notions
to computer technology without understanding the technology," which keeps revers-
ing the court of Customs and Patent Appeals without directly confronting the issue
of program patentability; and Congress, which, despite anxious pleas from the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue by statute, does nothing.
Id. See also In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that the case law
pertaining to the mental steps doctrine and patentable subject matter was "something of a
morass").
171. Ross, The Patentability of Computer Firmware, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 731, 744
(1977).
172. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (Supreme Court held their
decision did not preclude the patenting of computer programs); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 595 (1978) (Supreme Court stated their decision should not be interpreted to mean patents
on computer programs are contrary to policy, or not in furtherance of the useful arts); In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (C.C.P.A. held that simply because an
implementation uses a programmed computer, it is not thereby unpatentable). See also supra
notes 108-127 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment
of computer related patent cases as exhibited in Flook and Diehr).
173. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182-94; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588-
96; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-73 (Supreme Court does not set out clear patentability
requirements for computer inventions).
174. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
175. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
176. See, e.g., id. at 594-96; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72 (computer related inventions found
unpatentable).
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The precise definition of the term "math algorithm" has generated
some confusion among the courts. 178 The Supreme Court defines the
term to denote a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
formula, but this definition has not been understood by all to mean
the same thing.' 79 It is certain that if an invention does recite and
preempt the use of a math algorithm, whatever that term may
precisely mean, the invention will not be afforded patent protection. 18 0
Before we can determine whether MIS programs recite and preempt
math algorithms, we must first come to a firm understanding of the
term "math algorithm."
The reasoning behind the intolerance towards inventions which
attempt to patent math algorithms can be expressed by the following
syllogism: Clearly laws of nature are unpatentable, and since math
algorithms are numerical representations of laws of nature, they too
are unpatentable. 181 Taking this reasoning a step further, if a math-
ematical expression does not represent a law of nature, it would not
be termed a "math algorithm" and its use in an invention should
not prevent the invention from obtaining a patent. The question then
177. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the historic unpatentability
of math algorithms).
178. Compare In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1978), where the board of
appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office employed as its definition of the term algorithm:
1. a fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a simplified
procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full statement of a finite number
of steps.
2. A defined process or set of rules that leads and assures development of a desired
output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and or algebraic/logical steps
to calculate or determine a given task; processing rules.
Id. (quoting from C. SIPPLE & C. SIPPLE, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 23 (2d ed.
1972)); with id. at 877 (the Benson definition of the term algorithm: "[A] procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem," used by the CCPA).
179. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
180. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972). In both cases the Supreme Court denied a patent because the inventions recited and
preempted math algorithms.
181. See Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A
Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RUT. J. Com. TEcH. & L. 313, 338 n.200 (1979). See
also Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (where the Court stated: "Reasoning that an algorithm, or
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law
of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.").
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becomes: Which mathematical expressions represent laws of nature?
Consider the following equation, known as the Law of Universal
Gravitation: 182
F = (G X Ml X M2) / (r2).
All objects with mass have an attractive force between them.1 83 This
equation represents the relationship of the magnitude of that force
(F), with respect to the masses of the objects (Ml & M2), and the
distance between them (r).' 84 If M1 and M2 represent a person's mass
and the mass of the earth, respectively, and r is the distance from
the center of the earth to that person standing on the face of the
earth, F is equal to that person's weight.1 85 It is important to
understand that this mathematical equation is not limited to this fact
scenario. This same equation dictates physical relationships between
the sun and the moon, the sun and the earth, and the salt and pepper
shakers sitting on a kitchen table, as well as between all bodies in
the universe; hence the name, the Law of Universal Gravitation. This
equation is true today, it was true a thousand years ago, and it will
be true a thousand years into the future. This equation is, in the
purest sense, a representation of a law of nature.1
86
Consider, on the other hand, the following equation:
Aa*AE = (AS.k )2/E
This equation is used in the science of fracture mechanics. 87 The
precise meanings of the symbols are unimportant for our discussion.
One of the central aims of the science of fracture mechanics is to
predict how long a flawed metal part can operate in a vibrating
machine before failure; in large part, it is the study of metal fatigue.188
The equation set out above was formulated based on estimations and
assumptions about the properties and behavior of metals. 8 9 In prac-
tice this equation does not yield precise results, but rather gives
results only to within a statistical approximation, and in rare cases
182. D. HALLIDAY & R. REsocK, FuNDAmENTAlS OF PHYsICS 243 (2d ed. 1981).
183. Id.
184. Id. G is the number 6.672 x 10 to the negative eleventh power. Id. at 243-44.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. R. HERTZBERG, DEFORMATION AND FRAcTuru MECHANICS OF ENGINEERING MATERIALS
508 (2d ed. 1983).
188. See id. at 519-98.
189. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
does not represent the true behavior of the material at all. 190 In the
future, with continued research by scientists, the assumptions used
to formulate the equation may be shown to be erroneous.' 9' The
results yielded from the equation may have been accurate due to
sheer fortuity. 192 Therefore, it is not an expression of a law of nature
in the strictest sense, like the Law of Universal Gravitation.
Lastly, consider the familiar equation:
ax2 + bx + C = 0.
This is the standard form of a quadratic equation. 93 The roots of a
quadratic equation may be determined by use of the quadratic
formula: 194
x = -b ± Vb 2 - 4ac
2a
The quadratic formula is unlike the Universal Law of Gravitation
and the fracture mechanics formula. It is a general solution to a
mathematical problem that is not unique to any special field of
practice, but rather is common to many fields of study, including
non-scientific fields. 95 The central question now becomes manifest:
To which, if any, of the foregoing mathematical expressions does
the prohibition on reciting and preempting algorithms apply?
Substantial precedent stands for the proposition that the intent
behind the doctrine prohibiting recitation and preemption of algo-
rithms is to prevent laws of nature from being patented, and thus
monopolized. 96 If this is true, mathematical expressions like the
190. Id. See also 10 ASM METALS HANDBOOK 95-124 (8th ed. 1975) (detailing catastrophic
failures of assorted metal components due to fatigue).
191. R. HERTZBERG, DEFORMATION AND FRAcTu1E MEcHANIcs OF ENGINEERING MATERIALS
519-27 (2d ed. 1983).
192. Id.
193. E. SWOKOWSKI, FUNDAMENTALS OF COLLEGE ALGEBRA 69 (4th ed. 1978).
194. Id. at 72.
195. Id. at 73-74.
196. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (where the Court articulates
the limits of patentability for math and science related inventions). The Benson Court stated
that:
Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intel-
lectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomena of nature has
no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. While a scientific truth, or
the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful
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Universal Law of Gravitation, and possibly expressions akin to the
fracture mechanics formula, would be prohibited from inclusion in
any invention sought to be patented if such patent would have the
effect of preempting the formula itself.
Recall, however, the definition of "math algorithm" offered by
the Supreme Court: A procedure for solving a given type of math-
ematical problem. 197 The plain meaning of this definition seems
squarely to describe equations such as the quadratic formula. If the
purpose of the algorithm prohibition is to prevent the patenting of
laws of nature, then the definition employed by the Supreme Court,
which could include the quadratic formula applied to non-science
fields, clearly seems to be over-inclusive. Be that as it may, when
the mathematical relationships in MIS inventions are examined under
either of the plausible definitions of the algorithm-prohibition, it is
clear that neither of the plausible definitions are offended, and thus,
that the math algorithm prohibition should not prevent the patenting
of these inventions. 198
Consider again the Banking/Brokerage and Vehicle Financing in-
ventions. 99 The mathematical relationships utilized in the Banking/
Brokerage invention merely add and subtract to calculate interest
and stock dividends."' The Vehicle Financing invention is only slightly
more sophisticated in that it utilizes statistical analysis to determine
the depreciation in value of a vehicle. 2 1 Neither of the patents deals
with "laws of nature" in the strict sense, nor do they recite any
"quadratic-formula-like" equations. 202
It seems obvious that the mathematical relationships in the above-
mentioned patents were developed only to facilitate the specific goals
of the respective inventions, and are not useful or even applicable
to any other invention or field of study. They are merely elementary
mathematical processes created for a specific, and quite limited,
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.
Id. at 67 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1936);
LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (14 How. 1852); and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
197. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
198. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text (describing patent courts' acceptance
of MIS inventions for patent issuance, despite the challenge to the inventions' patentabilty on
"math algorithm" grounds).
199. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text (describing the relevant inventions).
200. United States Patent No. 4,694,397, supra note 143, at column 2.
201. United States Patent No. 4,736,294, supra note 141, at columns 1-2.
202. See United States Patents, Nos. 4,694,397 & 4,736,294, supra notes 143 & 141,
respectively.
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use.203 In light of the above, and the fact that patents have actually
been issued to MIS inventions, it is reasonably certain that MIS
inventions, to the extent that they rely on mathematical formulas or
relationships that are useful only to facilitate the specific goals of
the inventions and are not otherwise widely useable, will not be
denied patents on the ground that they recite and preempt math
algorithms. However, this is only reasonably certain because the
Patent Courts have been inconsistent and unpredictable in their
treatment of inventions which include mathematical expressions, com-
puter programs, or both. 204
3. Are MIS inventions "otherwise patentable"?
In this analysis of the patentability of MIS inventions, we have
thus far determined that even if these inventions consist primarily of
computer programming, this alone would not disqualify them from
patentability. 2 5 Furthermore, the prohibition of reciting and pre-
empting a math algorithm does not appear to pose a significant
obstacle to the patenting of these inventions either. 216
Recall, however, the guidelines to be followed as a result of the
most recent statement on this issue by the Supreme Court. 20 7 In
Diamond v. Diehr the Court asserted that computer related inventions
must apply the computer or formula to subject matter which deserves
the protection of the patent laws: The invention must be drawn to
subject matter which is "otherwise statutory," regardless of the
presence or absence of the computer or computer program. 2° Diehr
further suggested that when analyzing claims to a process, which is
what courts have customarily considered computer related inventions
203. Cf., In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (the CCPA recognizes that
some computer programs are devoid of any mathematical significance).
204. See Samuels & Samuels, The Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions, 6 CoRp.
L. REv. 144, 154 (1983) "Few areas of the law are as uncertain as the question whether
computer-related inventions recite patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent
Act of 1952." Id. "To a large extent, this is due to the judiciary's inability to set forth clear,
definite rules, and to the fact that each patent application is unique, thus rendering precedent
of limited value." Id.
205. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
willingness to allow patents on appropriate computer programs).
206. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text (describing the insignificance of the
"math-algorithm" prohibition, in the patenting of MIS inventions).
207. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (describing the guidelines suggested by
the Supreme Court in Diehr).
208. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 180, 187 (1981).
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to claim,20 9 the process should be evaluated as a whole and not
broken up into parts.
2 10
Application of the Diehr guidelines to the MIS patents quickly
points to a complication in the suggested analysis. The weight of
authority on computer related patents clearly indicates that, unless
specific apparatus are claimed, computer related inventions are con-
sidered "processes" insofar as section 101 is concerned. 211 Diehr
requires that such processes be analyzed "as a whole," but Diehr
also requires that the subject matter be "otherwise statutory. ' 21 2 In
other words, the subject matter must be statutory regardless of the
presence of the computer. 213 Quite logically, if one seeks to determine
if the process is "otherwise statutory," the computer element of the
invention would be ignored and the remaining invention would be
evaluated as to its worthiness of a patent in its own right; the
invention would be broken up into parts and analyzed. This course,
however, is directly contrary to the Diehr instruction to analyze the
invention "as a whole." This glitch in the logic notwithstanding, do
MIS inventions present subject matter which is "otherwise statu-
tory?"
Examination of representative patents reveals that the inventions
generally process data of one form or another. 21 4 The data is typically
representative of items such as money, credit, information, or the
like. 215 Consider, for example, the aforementioned Banking/Broker-
age and Vehicle Financing inventions. 21 6 The first of these inventions
collects and analyzes data concerning stock prices and buy/sell in-
structions from the user, in addition to processing data associated
209. See, e.g., id. at 177 (where the court describes the computer related invention therein
as a "process").
210. Id. at 188.
211. See, e.g. id. at 177-78; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591; Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 64-65. In all three cases, the Supreme Court considered the computer related
inventions at issue to be processes.
212. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89.
213. Id. at 189.
214. See, e.g., United States Patent No. 4,694,397, supra note 143, at column 1 ("The
present invention relates to financial business systems and deals more specifically with a data
processing methodology and related apparatus for effectuating a on-line realtime banking/
brokerage computer interface."); United States Patent No. 4,736,294, supra note 141, at
column I ("This application relates to data processing methods and apparatus for -managing
vehicle (e.g., automobile) financing."); United States Patent No. 4,674,044, supra note 141,
at column 1 ("This invention relates to business systems and, more specifically, to an improved
data processing based system for implementing an automated trading market for one or more
securities.").
215. See supra note 214 (examples of representative data).
216. See supra notes 143-54 (describing the two inventions).
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with a conventional bank account. 217 Similarly, the Vehicle Financing
invention analyzes data pertaining to a purchaser's credit history and
uses this data, along with data pertaining to the particular vehicle
sought to be purchased, to effectuate a proposed vehicle financing
agreement I.2 1  It seems clear that these MIS inventions do not operate
on physical substances in any way analogous to the rubber curing
process in Diehr. However, is the fact that they essentially operate
on data detrimental to their patentability?
Traditionally, computer related inventions have operated on phys-
ical substances. However, the modern trend taken by the PTO, and
exemplified by MIS inventions, appears to be following a philosophy
set out early by the CCPA in In re Prater.21 9 In Prater, the CCPA
deduced that because "machine" patents (like electric meters) were
not required to work on physical substances, there was no reason
"processes" should be required to do so either. 220 There is, however,
substantial language in several Supreme Court opinions which suggest
the opposite: That process inventions must indeed operate on physical
substances to be patentable.2 2' CCPA opinions have labelled this
language of the Supreme Court as "dicta," but if this language by
the Supreme Court is in fact the law, then inventions like MIS's
would be unpatentable because they cannot be said to operate on
physical substances.m
Patent commentators have argued against the principle that process
inventions must operate on physical substances, because in practice
217. See United States Patent No. 4,694,397, supra note 143, at column 2.
218. See United States Patent No. 4,736,294, supra note 141, at columns 2-3.
219. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1388 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
It is also appropriate, while pursuing this path of reasoning, to observe that the law
does not require that a machine, to be patentable, must act on physical substances,
for example, an electric meter. It does not seem consistent to impose such a
requirement on the other category of 35 U.S.C. § 101 -a process-without clearly
evident and distinguishing reasons which are not thus far apparent.
Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 ("[t]ransformation and reduction of
an article to a different state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines"); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876) ("[a]
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or
series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different
state or thing").
222. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (both cases describing language in past Supreme Court decisions
which indicates that process inventions must act on physical substances as "dicta"). See also
infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (where MIS-like inventions are described and shown
not to operate on physical substances).
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this leads to unreasonable results. 223 Consider the following: Although
theoretically possible,224 in practice, computer programs, or "soft-
ware," which are typically contained on magnetic disc, have not been
afforded patent protection; 225 but on the other hand, the more
tangible machine elements of a computer, or "hardware," have had
wider acceptance as patentable inventions.326 Advancements in com-
puter technology have added an additional player to the computer
patent game.227 This technology is known as "firmware. ' 22 Firmware
possesses attributes common to both hardware and software. 229 In
layman terms, firmware performs the same task as software, the only
difference being that firmware is embodied in a form traditionally
recognized as being hardware; a semiconductor "chip," for exam-
ple. 20 The question that then arises is whether firmware is patentable
like hardware, or unpatentable like software? 231 Or, in terms of
"process" inventions: If an unpatentable computer program con-
tained on magnetic disc programs a computer to perform a certain
process on data, does that program/process suddenly become pat-
entable if embodied in a form traditionally accepted as appropriate
for patent protection? Common sense would demand a "no" answer.
However, the answer appears to be "yes," based on the fact that
patents have been issued to firmware inventions.
232
Patent commentators criticize this result because it gives signifi-
cance to a meaningless distinction.23 3 Commentators argue that the
inventive substance of a typical data processing invention lies in the
process itself, and to give meaning to the embodiment chosen to
223. See Miller, Software Patents Today, PAT. L. ANN. 151-52 (1972); Novick & Wallen-
stein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A Scientific View of a Legal
Problem, 7 RuT. J. CoMi. TECH. & LAw 334-35 (1979).
224. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court opinions
that make clear that computer programs are not per se barred from patentability).
225. Duggan, Patents on Programs? The Supreme Court Says No, 13 JURMEmTRIcs J. 135,
135-38 (1973).
226. See Ross, The Patentability of Computer Firmware, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 731, 767
(1977). See also Miller, Software Patents Today, PAT. L. ANN. 151 (1972).
227. Ross, The Patentability of Computer Firmware, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 731, 736-37.
228. Id. at 737.
229. Id. at 765.
230. Id. at 766-69.
231. Id. at 769.
232. See, e.g., In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (a firmware invention held to
claim statutory subject matter). See also United States Patent Nos. 4,042,972; 4,040,033;
4,015,242; 4,012,717; & 3,778,775 (all firmware inventions which obtained patents from the
PTO).
233. See Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A
Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RUTGERS J. Com. TECH. & LAw 313, 334-35 (1979).
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effectuate such process is illogical. 2 4 Would-be patent holders of
such inventions argue, however, that by embodying a program/
process in a hardware package, the invention changes from the
"process" category of section 101 to the "machine" category. 235 This
line of reasoning is, however, quite reminiscent of an old and
disingenuous ploy used to avoid patent rejection of unpatentable
processes by describing the processes as apparatus in the patent
application. 2 6 Some patent commentators go further and argue that
whether or not these inventions are "disguised process" or "appa-
ratus" is really irrelevant because either should theoretically be
patentable.23 7 Apparatuses are clearly patentable, and so are proc-
esses. 8 Furthermore, the firmware example makes it clear that it is
illogical to give consideration to the embodiment chosen to effectuate
a process invention.219 Therefore, some commentators argue that
process inventions such as those contained in MIS, software, or
firmware, and which act upon data, should be patentable regardless
of their embodiment or the fact that they do not operate on physical
substances.3 One patent court has impliedly accepted this rationale,
although the Supreme Court has yet to comment on the issue.24 1
Because patents have already been issued to a handful of MIS
inventions, and because at least one of these patents has been declared
valid in a challenge suit, we may conclude that, at least until a higher
court rules differently, MIS inventions appear to be "otherwise
statutory" as that term is described in Diehr.242
234. Id. See also In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 809 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (indicating that it does
not matter what apparatus is used to effectuate a process; it is the process and not the
apparatus which is being patented).
235. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d at 812. See also Ross, The Patentability of Computer Firmware,
59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 731, 769 (1977).
236. Miller, Software Patents Today, PAT. L. ANm. 151-52 (1972). See also Betts, Patenting
the MIS Strategic Edge, COMPUTERWORLD MAG., May 30, 1988, at I (stating that "[b]efore
the Supreme Court decision [in Diehr], when the patent office frowned on software patents,
the patent applications were artfully drafted to downplay their software content, . . . Now,
the applicants have come out of the closet and explicitly describe the software in flow charts,
diagrams and lines of code ... ").
237. See Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A
Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RuTGEgs J. CoM. TECH. & LAW 313, 334-35 (1979).
238. 35 U.S.C § 101 (1982).
239. See supra notes 227-38 and accompanying text (describing the paradox of firmware
patents).
240. See supra note 233.
241. See Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (upholding a challenge to a patent on data procesing
methods which did not operate on physical substances).
242. See United States Patents Nos. 4,674,044; 4,736,294; & 4,346,442, supra note 141,
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The one case which has directly challenged the subject-matter
validity of an MIS invention is Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.243
C. Paine Webber v. Merrill Lynch
1. The Invention
The MIS patent at issue in Paine Webber resembled the Banking/
Brokerage invention mentioned above.244 The Cash Management Ac-
count, as it is called, connects three financial services via computer
and associated program3 45 The invention allows automatic transac-
tions to transpire between a securities account, a money market
account, and a Visa checking account. 246 The patent holder asserted
that this inter-connection provides its users with synergistic benefits.2 47
For example, money generated in the securities account is automat-
ically re-invested in the money market account to make maximum
use of investment capital.2" Additionally, investment equity in the
securities and money market accounts are considered when calculating
credit limits in the Visa account.24 9 The patent-holder claimed that
these features, and others, make the invention an efficient and time-
saving device.2 0
2. The Opinion
Paine Webber sought a declaration that the patent was invalid
because it failed to claim a process, machine, manufacture or com-
and 4,694,397, supra note 143 (all MIS or MIS-like inventions which have obtained patents).
See also infra notes 244-73 and accompanying text (describing an unsuccessful judicial challenge
to the validity of an MIS patent). See generally supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text
(describing the meaning of the "otherwise statutory" requirement of Diehr).
243. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
244. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (describing the Banking/Brokerage
invention).
245. Paine Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1361.
246. Id.
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position of matter as required by section 101.251 Furthermore, Paine
Webber contended that the invention was "nothing more than the
combination of familiar business systems ... which have been con-
nected together so that financial information can be exchanged among
them," and that such systems cannot form the subject matter of a
valid patent.252 Paine Webber asserted this position in reliance upon
several pre-computer-era "business system" cases, where the inven-
tions at issue were denied patents under section 101. 251 As evidence
that the invention was merely a "business system," Paine Webber
pointed to the fact that the invention's specifications lacked mention
of any specific apparatus, but rather described the invention in terms
of "means" for performing certain functions. 2 4 This style of drafts-
manship, contended Paine Webber, showed the invention to be
unpatentable subject matter.2 5
The court began addressing Paine Webber's contentions by stating
that specific categorization of the invention into one of section 101's
categories, is unnecessary in a section 101 analysis. 256 The court only
needed to determine if the invention claimed patentable subject
matter, regardless of the label of the claim .- 7 Thus, Paine Webber's
argument, that inability to categorize an invention into a section 101
category precludes the invention's patenting, failed. 2-
In regard to Paine Webber's contention that the invention was an
unpatentable "business system," the court found Paine Webber's
case-law authority unpersuasive.2Y9 Rather, the court found a closer
analogy in previous computer related inventions which underwent
judicial review by the CCPA.216 In In re Toma, the CCPA found a
computerized method to translate natural spoken languages to be
251. Id. at 1365.
252. Id.
253. Id. The cases relied upon by Paine Webber to support their "business systems"
contention were: Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1949); In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942); Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908); Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
aff'd, 200 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1912); United States Credit System Co. v. American Credit Indem.
Co., 53 F. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1893).
254. Paine Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1365.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1366.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1368-69.
260. Id.
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statutory subject matter.261 In In re Phillips, the CCPA found that
a computer program designed to prepare architectural specifications,
which eliminated written specifications, was also a statutory subject
matter. 262 Using these precedents as examples, the court in Paine
Webber concluded that the invention at issue effectuated a highly
useful business method, and was not an unpatentable "business
system." 26 Furthermore, the court found that Paine Webber's ob-
jection to the non-specific drafting of the invention's specifications
was without merit because section 112 of the patent statute sanctioned
such draftsmanship. 26 With these issues addressed, the court turned
to the age-old question of whether the invention recited and pre-
empted a math algorithm.26s
The court utilized the familiar Benson definition 266 of a math
algorithm in its analysis of the claimed invention. 267 Significantly,
the court defined and distinguished a computer algorithm268 from a
math algorithm, 269 the former being considerably narrower in scope
than the latter.270 The court determined that the mathematical rela-
tionships contained in the invention were of the computer algorithm
type, and thus not unpatentable under the authority of Benson.27'
Because the invention utilized a computer program but did not
preempt the use of a math algorithm, and because Paine Webber's
challenges to the invention's patentability were also denied, the court
held that the threshold requirement of section 101 was met.272 The
court specifically found that the invention taught a method to effec-
tuate a business transaction, and that this was sufficient to fulfill
the subject matter requirement for patentability as set out in section
101.273
261. In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
262. In re Phillips, 608 F.2d 879, 883 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
263. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983).
264. Id. at 1365.
265. Id. at 1366.
266. The Supreme Court describes the term "algorithm" as a "procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical problem." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
267. Paine Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1368.
268. Id. at 1367. The computer algorithm is a procedure consisting of an operation to
combine data, mathematical principles and equipment for the purpose of interpreting and/or
acting upon a certain data input. Id.
269. Id. at 1366-67.
270. Id. at 1367.
271. Id. at 1368.
272. Id. at 1369.
273. Id.
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3. The Significance of Paine Webber
Unfortunately (but predictably) the decision in Paine Webber did
not make clear, in a single stroke, that which has been unclear for
several years. Although the example set by the cash management
account certainly provides an additional case law guideline to patent
practitioners who must analyze computer related inventions to deter-
mine their patentability, the lack of any express guidelines on the
proper analysis to be taken leaves many questions unanswered. Must
process inventions operate on physical substances to be patentable?
274
Are MIS and other computer related inventions processes or appa-
ratus? Does it matter?
Despite its perpetuation of these ambiguities, the decision in Paine
Webber does seem to follow a general trend towards relaxing the
standards for patenting computer related inventions. 275 For example,
United States Patent No. 4,483,680 was issued in 1984 and provides
a computer assisted geneological information and recording service;
and United States Patent No. 4,464,122, also issued in 1984, provides
a computer assisted health potential summary and incentive system.
2 76
Whether this trend toward liberal application of patent standards
will prove to be beneficial to the goals of the patent system remains
in doubt, however. 277
IV. CONCLUSION
The availability of patent protection for companies and individuals
who invest the time and resources to develop new and useful inven-
tions is an important national interest, beneficial to both the inventor
and society in general. The financial benefit to the inventor, however,
274. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text (discussing the patentability of processes
which do not operate on physical substances).
275. See Walsh, The Disclosure Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and Software Related
Patent Applications: Debugging the System, 18 CONN. L. REv. 855, 856 n.4 (1986).
276. United States Patent No. 4,483,680: Genealogical Information Recording and Arrange.
ment Method and Apparatus, inventor Louise A. Daly, Patent Application No. 560,737, filed
December 12, 1983, granted November 20, 1984. United States Patent No. 4,464,122: Health
Potential Summary and Incentive System, inventor Berkeley Fuller, Patent Application No.
446,344, filed December 2, 1982, granted August 7, 1984.
277. See, e.g., Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14,
1989, § B, at 1, col 1; Schneidawind, Key Software Patent May Bring Warfare, S.F. Chronicle,
April 19, 1989, § C, at 1, col 1.
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should be no more important than the broad range of benefits to
society.2 7 It is manifest, therefore, that the patent system should
never be used for the benefit of an inventor where that use also
substantially undermines the societal goals of the patent system. The
patentability of MIS inventions presents just such a problem.
It is beyond question that the MIS inventions discussed earlier,
and others, provide a useful service to those who employ them; but
at what cost to society's productivity? There are indications that the
growing acceptability of computer program patents, such as MIS-
invention patents, has led to a chilling of the creative process which
the patent laws were designed to promote.2 79
The problem originates in the Patent Office itself, where examiners
are ill-equipped to handle the burgeoning number of computer related
patent applications filed yearly.280 IBM alone files 200 of these, and
other top United States companies have recently doubled and even
quadrupled their number of computer related patent applications.
281
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Patent Office takes
an average of thirty-two months to process a computer program
278. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). The Kewanee Court
stated that:
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress to legislate
in the area of intellectual property is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Art." The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a
limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms
of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have
a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employ-
ment and better lives for our citizens.
Id.
279. See Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989,
§ B, at I, col I (describing how the growing threat of patent infringement litigation has
slowed the progress of computer software development). See also Schneidawind, Key Software
Patent May Bring Warfare, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 19, 1989, § C, at 1, col. 1 (describing how
a patent, recently issued to a small Southern California software company, could have the
effect of fundamentally changing the structure of the personal computer software industry).
280. See Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989,
§ B, at I, col. 1 (describing the Patent Office as unsophisticated and inept in the area of
computer software patentability). See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)
(quoting a 1966 report of the Presidents Commission on the Patent System):
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack
of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these were available,
reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous
volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs
would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be
all but nonexistent.
Id.
281. Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989, § B,
at 1, col. I.
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related application. 2 During the time period the Patent Office is
reviewing an application, companies in the fast-moving computer
industry sometimes unwittingly infringe patents, only later to be
charged licensing fees, or even worse, to be dragged into court in an
infringement suit. Many such suits have in fact been litigated, much
to the distress of computer industry managers. 23 Corporate counsels
have complained that "[t]he playing field is now littered with explo-
sive devices. You don't know they're there, [patents] until you step
on one."12U 4 Even more disturbing is the possibility that some of the
most traditionally innovative sources of computer inventions, the
small companies, will be hardest hit by the pervasive patenting of
computer programs because of these companies' limited resources
available for legal efforts.
Can these problems be solved? Can MIS inventions, as well as
other computer program related inventions, enjoy the rewards of
patent protection without unduly hindering the creative process? It
is certainly clear from the analysis of MIS inventions, and the related
judicial decisions, that the patent laws as they exist today are not
opposed to patents on computer related inventions, MIS or otherwise.
The problems seem to lie in the administration of the patent system
with regard to these inventions. All commentators seem to agree that
the present system is confused and unpredictable. The patent laws
need to be revised so that deserving computer-related inventions can
receive timely and meaningful patent protection; but such revision is
not a simple task. There exists a "technology gap" between the
inventors of computer-related inventions and the people responsible
for their patent administration. 25 This technology gap will take time
to bridge. In the interim, it seems prudent to proceed conservatively
in this area so that a fair and uniform application of the law can be
assured.
In pursuit of this objective, the proposal set forth by Justice
Stevens, in his dissent in Diamond v. Diehr, seems squarely on
point.2 6 Justice Stevens recognized in 1982 that the patent laws do




285. See generally Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!,
47 U. PiT. L. REv. 1023 (1986).
286. 450 U.S. 173, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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which, if any, computer related inventions may be patented. 287 Be-
cause this situation still exists, and because certainty in this area is
to the benefit of all concerned, it is suggested that Justice Stevens'
proposed rule be adopted as law. Justice Stevens proposed that no
program related invention be patentable unless it makes a contribu-
tion to the art that is not dependent entirely on the use of a
computer. 218 This rule would have the effect of rendering MIS in-
ventions unpatentable. Lack of patentability does not destroy an
inventions worth, however. Many commentators believe current cop-
yright and trade secret laws adequately protect computer related
inventions. 289
This author suggests, that as a corollary to Justice Stevens' pro-
posed rule, Congress should declare that patentable processes, unlike
patentable machines, must operate on physical substances. This rule
would help end the war of semantics which arises when classifying
inventions in section 101 categories. The combination of these meas-
ures would instill predictability in this currently confused area, and
would allow the future controlled statutory expansion of the patent
laws for deserving computer related inventions.
Meredith Chang
287. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. See generally, Von Spakovsky, The Limited Patenting of Computer Programs: A
Proposed Statutory Approach, 16 CtmB. L. Rnv. 27 (1985).

